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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
-vs.-
EUGENE MYERS, 
Respondent, 
Appellant. 
Case No. 
8504 
Respondent's Brief 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Eugene Myers was charged in a complaint signed 
by T. A. Callicott, charging the appellant with grand 
larceny. The complaint was filed July 1, 1954. With his 
counsel the appellant was present in the chambers of 
examining magistrate where he answered to his true 
name, received a copy of the complaint and thereafter 
personally waived preliminary hearing (R. 2). At this 
time the court bound the defendant over to the District 
Court. On the same day Eugene Myers was arraigned in 
the District Court, and with counsel present, entered a 
plea of guilty to the charge of grand larceny (R. 5). 
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The State then moved to dismiss the original complaint 
filed against the apellant charging him with armed rob-
bery, the grand larceny complaint having been substi-
tuted when appellant agreed to enter a guilty plea. 
On July 21, 1954, upon the motion of appellant and 
based on an affidavit filed by him, the court allowed 
appellant to withdraw his guilty plea and enter a plea 
of not guilty, a new trial date being set. Alan Swan, the 
first of five court appointed attorneys, withdrew as coun-
sel July 31, 1954 (R. 31). On October 4, 1954, Donn E. 
Cassity was appointed counsel; the next day he sub-
mitted his withdrawal (R. 32). That same day James E. 
Houston was appointed counsel and on October 7th he 
was allowed to withdraw. On October 26th, Lee Hobbs 
was appointed counsel for appellant. During the month 
of September 1954, upon motion of the appellant, the 
District Attorney furnished two separate bills of particu-
lar concerning the charge against appellant. On January 
13, 1955, the court set the date for trial as March 15, 1955. 
On March 7, 1955, Mr. Hobbs was released from an order 
issued by Judge Lewis Jones, which required him to 
perfect an appeal on the denial of a writ of habeas 
corpus and also released him from subpoenaing cer-
tain witnesses named by the defendant as being material 
(R. 46-51). On :March 8, l~l33, a minute order was made 
by Judge Jones regarding the Eugene :Myers writ of 
habeas corpus, which minute entry made all of his orders 
subject to modification by the Criminal Division of the 
Third District Court ( R. 50). 
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Upon the court's motion on March 11, 1955, two doc-
tors were designated to examine the appellant as to his 
sanity. After the examination the doctors recommended 
to the court that the appellant be sent to the State Hos-
pital in Provo for a thirty day observation period 
(R. 58-60). On April 7, 1955, Dr. Owen P. Heninger, 
Superintendent of the State Hospital, in a letter ad-
dressed to Judge Ellett, said that based upon the thirty 
day observation it was the opinion of Dr. Heninger and 
his staff that Mr. Myers was in need of hospitalization. 
He also indicated that it would be inadvisable for Myers 
to attend the sanity hearing because of the adverse effects 
it might have upon him (R. 62). On April 8, 1955, Judge 
Ellett ordered that a :final hearing regarding the sanity 
of appellant be held April 18, 1955. Based upon the in-
formation presented at the hearing, the court entered an 
order committing Myers to the hospital until his sanity be 
restored (R. 67). 
On October 26, 1955, the court entered an order, the 
Superintendent of the Hospital having certified appellant 
to be sane, that he be transferred back to the Salt Lake 
County Jail and there await trial (R. 71 and 73). On 
~ ovember 16, 1955, appellant appeared in court, where 
he was informed that the trial had been set for Novem-
ber 25, 1955, the court having appointed as counsel, Mr. 
Wayne Ashworth. On November 19, 1955, the court or-
dered that appellant's motion for continuance of trial 
be denied (R. 75). Also on November 22, 1955, the court 
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ordered that Mr. Ashworth's motion to withdraw be 
denied (R. 76). On November 25, 1955, the appellant did 
come to trial before Judge Ray VanCott, Jr., the appel-
lant appearing in person and being represented by Mr. 
Ashworth. In the absence of the jurors, the court in-
formed the appellant that Mr. Ashworth, who had been 
appointed to defend him, would be present to assume this 
responsibility if the appellant so desired, and also in-
formed the appellant that if he proceeded as he had 
threatened to do, to sing the "Star Spangled Banner" 
and otherwise disrupt the court, that the appellant would 
be confined to the Judge's chambers while the trial pro-
ceeded (R. 134). Prior to the calling of the State's wit-
nesses, the defendant requested that he be permitted to 
change his plea from "not guilty" to "not guilty by rea-
son of insanity" (R. 136). At this time the court asked 
him if the appellant wished to enter the defense of insan-
ity and appellant indicated that he didn't claim to be 
insane; he didn't want the defense of insanity; he just 
merely wanted to enter the plea of not guilty by reason 
of insanity (R. 136). 
During the colloquy between the court and ~Ir. :Jiyers 
(R. 136 to 139) appellant kept insisting that he wanted 
Ashworth to withdraw because he claimed that Ashworth 
would not be able to help him rereiYe a fair trial, the 
Judge at all times insisting that Ashworth would be pres-
ent to offer advice and assistance whenever appellant 
desired unless the appellant actually discharged ::\Ir. Ash-
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worth. At the request of the appellant all witnesses were 
excluded (R. 144). 
The first witness called by the State was Wayne 
Luck, one of the persons from whom the property in 
question had been stolen (R. 148). Mr. Luck testified 
that he was in the company of Mr. Dean Jones, Miss Rose 
Arlene Thompson and a Miss Joan Reser early on the 
morning of March 29, 1954. While thus gathered to-
gether in the motel, two masked men entered the cabin 
and forced Mr. Luck and Mr. Jones to stand with their 
faces against the wall and thereafter stripped from 
each man's wrist a watch and took from each man a 
wallet. Mr. Luck also had taken from him his glasses 
(R. 150-151). 
The next witness called on behalf of the State was 
Mr. Marion F. Barnett, a police officer from Twin Falls, 
Idaho. He testified that March 30, 1954, he stopped a 
car which was being driven by the appellant because of a 
request from the Salt Lake City police department that 
the Idaho police forces be on the lookout for that car 
(R. 185). After the arrest the appellant was taken to the 
Police Station at Twin Falls and a search disclosed that 
he was carrying a plastic bag tied around his waist 
which contained two watches and a small revolver 
(R. 185). Mr. Barnett identified the watches that had 
been placed in evidence as those recovered from the 
defendant in Twin Falls, one of the watches also having 
been identified by Mr. Luck as the one stripped from his 
wrist on the night of March 29th (R. 186). 
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The State's next witness was a Mr. Spencer Duffin. 
Mr. Duffin testified that he was the owner of a motor 
lodge called the Maple Motel. He testified to the fact 
that he had seen the appellant on March 29, 1954 at his 
motel, accompanied by a girl (R. 201). The girl entered 
his office and rented the cabin, said cabin being the one 
in which the two wallets taken from Luck and Jones 
were found the day after the robbery (R. 210). 
Mr. Max B. MeHenry was the next witness called on 
behalf of the State. Mr. McHenry testified that he was a 
deputy sheriff of Salt Lake County. It was he, accom-
panied by Mr. T. A. Callicott, that returned the appellant 
and his companions from Idaho to Utah (R. 208). He 
also testified that the watches and gun that had been 
placed in evidence were received from the Idaho Falls 
Police and had been transported by him to Salt Lake City 
(R 208). 
The State's next witness was Rose Arlene Thompson. 
Miss Thompson testified that she had met ~Ir. Luck and 
Mr. Jones during the late afternoon of ~I arch 28, 1955, 
and that she remained in their company proceeding from 
one tavern to another during the rest of the evening 
(R. 224). When Luck and Jones returned ~Iiss Thomp-
son to her home, she discovered a note requesting that 
she come to the Nelson Motor Lodge, the note being 
signed by ''Gene.'' Luck and Jones drove l\Iiss Thomp-
son to the motor lodge, and after she had consulted with 
the occupant of the cabin, she invited both of the men 
in for a few drinks ( R. 225). This was approximately 
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12 :30 on the morning of March 29, 1954. After the men 
and Miss Thompson had been at the cabin for approxi-
mately an hour, two masked men entered the cabin, one 
holding a gun (R. 226). At their command Jones and 
Luck took the position facing the wall and were then re-
lieved of their watches and wallets, and in the case of Mr. 
Luck, his glasses. Miss Thompson testified at this time 
that she recognized the appellant's voice (R. 227). Miss 
Thompson testified that later during the same day 
she was in the company of Miss Reser, the appellant 
and another man, and at that time saw watches and wal-
lets similar to the ones taken from Jones and Luck when 
she, along with the other persons named, were at the 
Maple Motor Lodge (R. 233). 
The next witness for the State was Jay Emer 
Nelson, owner of the Nelson Motor Lodge, the place where 
the robbery took place. Mr. Nelson testified that he saw 
the defendant enter the cabin the one in which Luck and 
Jones were robbed, on March 28, 1954, and felt that he 
could make a positive identification because he had seen 
the defendant several times prior to that date and had 
seen the defendant enter the same cabin (R. 312). 
Mr. Myers then took the stand and testified in his 
own defense substantially as follows. Appellant claimed 
that at the time the robbery was committed he was either 
at a movie or at the Porters and Waiters Club (R. 330). 
He says that he was requested by Miss Thompson and 
.:\Iiss Reser to drive them to Boise and took the job be-
cause they had offered him $75.00 to do so (R. 333). His 
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claim is that while they were traveling towards Boise the 
girls asked him to take the bag in which the watch and 
gun were contained and he did it at their request (R. 335). 
He also admits that the watches and the gun were found 
on him by the police after his arrest at Twin Falls. 
The matter was submitted to the jury which returned 
a verdict of guilty of grand larceny. Thereafter, at the 
request of the appellant, the court appointed Grover 
Giles to help him to perfect his appeal. The date of sen-
tencing was set for December 24, 1955, however, the 
appellant was sentenced on December 23, 1955. Mr. Giles 
withdrew as counsel and the appellant proceeded on his 
own with this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
APPELLANT WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF ANY 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT WHEREIN IT IS PRO-
VIDED THAT IN A CRI~IIXAL PROSECUTION THE 
ACCUSED SHALL HA YE THE RIGHT TO APPEAR 
AND DEFEND BY PERSON OR BY COr~"SEL BE-
CAUSE HE HAD THE SERVICES OF SIX CAP-
ABLE AND EXPERIENCED ~-\. TTORNEYS. 
POINT II 
THE APPELLANT HEREIX \YA8 XOT PLACED 
IN JEOPARDY A SECOND TIME \YHE~ THE SEC-
OND COMPLAINT AND INFORJ\IATION WERE 
FILED NOR WAS HE PREJUDICED BY THE 
COURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW APPELLANT TO 
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AMEND HIS PLEA TO NOT GUILTY BY REASON 
OF INSANITY. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF HIS 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONFRONT THE 
WITNESSES AGAINST HIM. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF HIS 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO COMPEL THE 
ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES IN HIS OWN BE-
HALF. 
POINT V 
THE VERDICT AND JUDGMENT IS NOT CON-
TRARY TO THE LAW AND EVIDENCE AND DOES 
NOT VIOLATE THE APPELLANT'S CONSTITU-
TIONAL RIGHTS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF ANY 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT WHEREIN IT IS PRO-
VIDED THAT IN A CRIMINAL PROSECUTION THE 
ACCUSED SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO APPEAR 
AND DEFEND BY PERSON OR BY COUNSEL BE-
CAUSE HE HAD THE SERVICES OF SIX CAP-
ABLE AND EXPERIENCED ATTORNEYS. 
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On July 1, 1954, appellant appeared in court and 
entered a plea of guilty to grand larceny. During all the 
proceedings he was represented by an attorney whom 
he had retained. The attorney he retained has the reputa-
tion of being a good criminal lawyer. After his attorney 
had made an investigation of the case he apparently felt 
that appellant would be best served by entering a plea of 
guilty to grand larceny and this appellant did by stepping 
forward and personally entering the guilty plea (R. 5). 
Within two weeks after appellant had entered his plea 
of guilty he filed with the court an affidavit claiming that 
his counsel had coerced him into pleading guilty. This 
affidavit was prepared with the assistance of another 
attorney and the record does not show for certain whether 
he was employed by appellant or appointed by the court. 
After the filing of this affidavit both attorneys, the one 
originally retained and the second attorney to enter the 
case withdrew. 
Appellant has ever since tried to proceed upon the 
theory of ''unlimited substitution'' of counsel in the 
hopes that he could find an attorney willing to take the 
case and proceed as appellant directed, doing so with-
out question. This dedication was to be displayed as to 
the procedural aspects of the case as well as to the law. 
The ''unlimited substitution rule'' devised by appellant 
caused the court to appoint two other attorneys each in 
turn. It is interesting to note that both of these attor-
neys apparently filed withdrawals with the court after 
the initial intt'rYiew with appellant. Again the court 
obliged appellant by appointing another attorney to rep-
10 
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resent him. This time it was Mr. Lee Hobbs who, under 
the authorization of the court appointment, spent con-
siderable time and effort on behalf of appellant. All of 
the attorneys that had been either retained by appellant 
or appointed by the court were capable and experienced 
in the practice of law. 
Included in the record is a letter sent by Mr. Hobbs 
to Judge Lewis Jones concerning a hearing held before 
Judges Jones and some orders issued by the court at that 
time. This letter discloses the handicap Mr. Hobbs was 
forced to work under while representing appellant, and 
respondent feels the letter would be wholeheartedly en-
dorsed as a factual and true picture of the appellant's 
attitude by all the attorneys who had represented him 
prior to and since Mr. Hobbs' appointment. Mr. Hobbs 
explained to the judge that he had '' * * * had a great 
deal of trouble with this case, all of it due to Mr. Myers' 
insistence on dictating how the case should be handled in 
every detail." Mr. Hobbs goes on and explains the situa-
tion in the following words : 
'' * * * My immediate concern is with the follow-
ing problems. 
First, the question of Mr. Myers' supposedly nec-
essary witnesses. I did not and do not want to 
jeopardize Mr. Myers' position before the court 
and so to date have made no record as to my rea-
sons for refusing to obtain Mr. Myers' witnesses. 
J\fr. Myers has admitted to me and I am advised 
by his former attorney that Myers admitted to him 
that these witnesses would say anything that 
Myers wanted them to. Further, following our 
appearance in your court here in Salt Lake, I went 
11 
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to see Myers in jail and demanded to know why he 
had claimed to want these witnesses after agree-
ing with me that they would not called. He stated 
at that time, without any hesitancy, that he had 
made the plea for these witnesses for the sole 
purpose of delaying his trial and indicated that 
the addresses that he gave for the out of state wit-
nesses would prove fruitless * * * (R. 43). 
The appellant having been successful in delaying his 
trial by being uncooperative and demanding upon his 
counsel, also managed to impress the court in such a 
manner that the court, upon its own motion, set up a 
mental examination for appellant by the appointment of 
two alienists (R 59). Based upon this initial examina-
tion appellant was sent to the hospital at Provo for an 
observation period of 30 days. At the end of the 30 day 
period the Superintendent of the Hospital, in a letter 
addressed to Judge Ellett of the Third District Court, 
expressed the opinion that appellant was in need of hos-
pitalization. Based upon that letter the court in April of 
1955 held a mental hearing and committed appellant to 
the hospital until restored to sanity (R. 67). The medi-
cal staff at the hospital within a six months period 
became increasingly aware of the fact that appellant was 
not insane and apparently had cleverly duped them 
into believing that he was. Upon certification by the hos-
pital that appellant was sane, he was returned to the 
Salt Lake County Jail to await trial (R. 71). At this 
time the court appointed another attorney to represent 
appellant because Mr. Hobbs had withdrawn. The court 
appointed Mr. Wayne Ashworth. 
12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The record of appellant's trial held in November of 
1955 contains many statements made by appellant about 
his lack of counsel and the fact that Mr. Ashworth was 
not prepared nor willing to represent him. However, the 
record does not show that Mr. A§_hworth ever in any 
way displayed that he was unwilling or unprepared in 
this matter. However, he did file a motion for contin-
uance which was denied by the judge. This denial was 
within the discretion of the court, wherein Section 
77-24-18, U.C.A. 1953, provides that: 
''After his plea the defendant shall be entitled to 
at least two days to prepare for trial, but the time 
for trial shall not be postponed for a longer time 
than the court may deem imperative.'' 
In the cases of State v. Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d 
750; State v. Loughney, 70 Utah 526, 261 P. 606, this 
Court has recognized that it is within the discretion of 
the trial court to expand or limit the time which the 
accused may have to prepare his case between the plea 
and the date of trial. The statute provides that two days 
is sufficient. In this instance appellant and counsel had 
full seven days to prepare for his trial. Courts in other 
jurisdictions have held that where the court appoints 
an attorney to represent an individual accused of a crime, 
except in capital cases, there is sufficient time for prepa-
ration where counsel is allowed two days or more. In the 
case of People v. Shiffman, 350 Ill. 243, 182 N.E. 760, 
the court held that where the accused was on trial for 
grand larceny, the defendant's attorney not appearing 
and the court assigned him another, there was not suffi-
cient time to prepare for trial where the defendant and 
13 
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his counsel were allowed only five minutes. In the fol-
lowing cases it was held that defendant had been de-
prived of counsel where the court had appointed an 
attorney to represent the accused on the day of the trial 
and then required the accused to stand trial that very 
same day. Mc.Arver v. State, 114 Ga. 514, 40 S.E. 779; 
Reliford v. State, 140 Ga. 777, 79 S.E. 1128. Even in 
capital cases the courts have indicated that two or three 
days is sufficient time for preparation, the court objecting 
to a forty minute consultation period allowed defendant 
his newly appointed attorney in Dunmas v. State, --
Okla. Crim. Rep.--, 16 P.2d 886. 
The court in denying :Mr. Ashworth's motion to 
withdraw, again acted within its discretion. ~lr. Ash-
worth then was obligated as an officer of the court to 
continue and prepare to the best of his ability a case in 
defense of the appellant. Judge Ray VanCott, Jr., in 
refusing both of the motions made by ~lr. Ashworth 
said simply that the case had been continued too often 
and that the trial was not going to be delayed any longer. 
Therefore, Mr. Ashworth was obligated to be prepared 
and be present on the day of the trial, and he did fulfill 
his obligation. 
On the day of trial, November :25, 1955, the appellant 
was present as was Mr. Ashworth. Appellant insisted 
that he did not feel or think that ~lr. Ashworth could 
guarantee him a fair trial and therefore did not wish 
Mr. Ashworth to represent him (R. 136-138, 167-168). 
When the court reconvened after the noon recess, the 
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court again informed appellant that Mr. Ashworth was 
there, ready and willing to represent him. The court 
questioned appellant as to his reasons for not using 
the talents of Mr. Ashworth, and :finally concluding, and 
we think very justly so, that appellant had discharged Mr. 
Ashworth as his counsel (R. 168). Appellant, though 
denying he was acting as his own counsel, had assumed 
the burden of cross-examining the witnesses presented by 
the State and did a good job of it. 
All during the trial appellant kept insisting that he 
was being denied counsel, and that therefore his consti-
tutional rights were being violated. This was done always 
when the jury was present. After a careful reading of 
the record a person could not conclude that appellant had 
been denied counsel. His own testimony refutes this. 
''The Court : Well I will have to remind you again 
that you have persistently refused to have a law-
yer until today. 
Mr. Myers: Your Honor, I have not. I don't wish 
to dispute you. Your Honor, I have asked the 
lawyers to exercise the court's orders. On Jan-
uary 13th Judge Jones ordered that a writ of 
habeas corpus-
The Court: Well now, wait. I am not going into 
that. You have spent 18 months going into that. 
Mr. Myers: I have not really refused lawyers. I 
have refused men who came over and who refused 
to carry out the cottrt's orders." (R 360) 
It is interesting to contrast this with the sentiments 
expressed in Mr. Hobbs' letter to Judge Lewis Jones. 
This alone should be almost enough to convince the court 
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that it was not the attorneys' refusal to represent appel-
l~nt, but rather their objection to trying the case on his 
theories. It was the appellant's insistence that the attor-
l).eys do his bidding that caused the withdrawal of not 
only the lawyer he had first hired, but also all five of the 
court-appointed counsel. See U. S. v. Gutterma;n, 147 
P.2d 540. 
Respondent agrees that in the State of Utah the 
trial court is under a duty to appoint counsel for an 
accused criminal where the criminal is unable to employ 
his own. Other jurisdictions, both federal and state, 
indicate that though the court is obliged to appoint 
counsel initially, the court is not obliged to appoint as 
counsel a new attorney each week until the appellant is 
satisfied that the man is wholeheartedly behind him and 
sincerely believes in his cause. State v. Griffith, 14 N.J.S. 
72, 81 Atl. 2d 382 held: 
''A person accused of a crime is only entitled to 
counsel to aid him in his defense, not to save him 
from his voluntary acts.'' 
Appellant's attempt to dictate to the attorneys the basis 
upon which they were to carry on his case, though not an 
express discharge of counsel, certainly made it impos-
sible and impractical for the attorneys to continue, and 
we believe is equivalent to an actual discharge of coun-
sel. U. 8. v. Gutterman, 147 F.2d 540 states as follows: 
''An accused unable to employ an attorney must 
accept such counsel as the court assigns unless he 
can find a better reason for asking a change than 
the fact that the accused does not approve of coun-
sel's judgment or unless the accused chooses to 
undertake his own defense.'' 
16 
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As the record bears out, up to and through the trial 
held in November 1955, six competent attorneys were 
at one time or other either hired by appellant or appoint-' 
ed to represent him. The fact that appellant did not 
approve of counsel's judgment is certainly not reason, as 
above stated, for him to be allowed time and again to 
have the court appoint men under his "unlimited substi-· 
tution" rule until he be satisfied. In the case of People v. 
Adamson, 210 P.2d 13, 34 C.2d 320, the court held that 
a defendant's right to counsel did not include the right 
to postpone his trial indefinitely and reject the services' 
of competent counsel appointed by the court while the· 
defendant, at his leisure, attempted to find counsel who 
would serve without charge and whose ideas about the 
case were similar to his own. Also in the case of U. S. ex 
rel. Mitchell v. Thompson, 56 F. Supp. 683, the court 
declared that the court's choice of counsel should not be 
subject to impeachment on the ground that the defendant 
claimed displeasure with the appointment or that defend-
ant lacked confidence in his attorney. It is only upon a 
showing of good cause why the appointment should not 
be made that the defendant can expect to receive addi'-
tional counsel by way of court appointment. Could any-
one who has had the services of six capable and expe-
rienced attorneys be said to have been denied his right·· 
to counseU In this case it was only the appellant's obsti-
nate attitude, uncooperativeness and misconception of 
the law that denied him the right of counsel, if it ran 
be said by the furtherest stretch of the imagination that 
he was denied counsel. 
17 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT II 
THE APPELLANT HEREIN WAS NOT PLACED 
lN JEOPARDY A SECOND TIME WHEN THE SEC-
OND COMPLAINT AND INFORMATION WERE 
FILED NOR WAS HE PREJUDICED BY THE 
COURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW APPELLANT TO 
AMEND HIS PLEA TO NOT GUILTY BY REASON 
OF INSANITY. 
It is common practice and I am sure that the court is 
aware of it, that in many instances the prosecuting attor-
neys in this state find it both desirable and expedient to 
make an agreement with the accused that upon the 
accused's promise to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser 
offense included in the offense charged in the informa-
tion the prosecuting attorney will recommend to the 
court that it accept said plea and thereby dismiss the 
more serious crime alleged in the information. Section 
77-24-8, U.C.A. 1953, provides that: 
"The defendant, with the consent of the court and 
the prosecuting attorney, may plead guilty to any 
lesser offense than that charged which is included 
in the offense charged in the information or indict-
ment, or of any lesser degree of the offense 
charged.'' 
11his principle is well recognized in the law of this state 
as well as in most other jurisdictions. In the case of Radej 
v. State, 152 \Yisc. 503, 140 N.\Y. ~1, the rule was stated 
that where hy agreement the accused is allowed to plead 
guilty to a lesser offense that it i8 a bar to the prosecution 
for the greater offense on a new trial. In all of the eases 
dealing with this problem, it i8, of course, pointed out that 
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the accused did agree, prior to the prosecuting attorney's 
recommendation to the court, to enter a plea of guilty to 
the lesser offense. Though appellant's consent does not 
appear in the record, it is most logically presumed that 
he did either personally or by and through his attorney 
agree to plead guilty to grand larceny if the robbery 
charge was dismissed. As the record points out (R. 2) 
and in spite of appellant's affidavit to the contrary, he 
personally appeared and waived preliminary hearing 
after having answered to his true name and after a copy 
of the complaint had been delivered to his attorney. On 
that same day he appeared in the District Court where 
he was arraigned on an information filed by the District 
Attorney. The information charged appellant with grand 
larceny. In open court, with his attorney present and 
representing him, appellant came forward and entered a 
plea of guilty to grand larceny. In appellant's affidavit 
which was filed about 16 days later (R. 7) he makes great 
importance of his claim that his attorney coerced him into 
entering such a plea. There is no evidence or testimony 
other than appellant's affidavit concerning the claimed 
coercion. 
In the case of Sayer v. Commonwealth, 194 Ky. 338, 
238 S.W. 737, the court, referring to an individual who 
later complained that he had not received the aid of 
competent counsel in perfecting his defense, said: 
''A defendant who is suri juris cannot complain 
after the trial, for the first time, that he selected 
the wrong lawyer to represent him at his triaL 
If his attorney is unwilling to present his true de-
fense, or proposes to offer a false defense, or to 
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do anything which to the defendant appears at 
war with the facts, with good faith, and in fair 
dealing, it is the defendant's duty then to appeal 
to the court, on whom he has the right to rely for 
protection. If he fails to do so before the trial is 
concluded, so as to give the trial judge an oppor-
tunity to assign him counsel, stop the proceedings, 
and impanel a new jury or take such steps as will 
insure the defendant a fair trial, the acts of his 
counsel will be imputed to the defendant, who will 
be regarded as sanctioning the proceedings con-
cluded thereby.'' 
Appellant, though the record doesn't show it, must have 
agreed to the filing of the grand larceny information; cer-
tainly through his attorney he did in fact consent and· 
through his attorney, undoubtedly after consulting with 
him, agreed to enter his plea of guilty to the grand lar-
ceny complaint. 
There is no question about the law in Utah concern-
ing former jeopardy. When a jury has been once impan-
elled and sworn the accused is placed in double jeopardy 
when or if he is again called into court to answer an infor-
mation charging him with a crime based upon the same 
facts. However, in appellant's case the District Attor-
ney filed with the court a new information only after the 
defendant had consented to this action and had agreed 
to plead guilty to grand larceny. 
In the case of Amrine v. Tines, 131 F.2d 827, the 
court held that where the first information is dismissed 
and the accused does not seasonably object thereto, a sec-
ond trial does not constitute double jeopardy. Where the 
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accused consents to the dismissal of a jury that has been 
impanelled and sworn or to the dismissal of the original 
complaint and the refiling of another information and 
complaint, the defense of former jeopardy is not available 
to the accused. This is also the rule where the court de-
clares a mistrial, where the accused has either given his 
consent, or requested the court to so act. State v. Malouf, 
287 S.W.2d 79; U. S. v. Cimino. 224 F.2d 27 4; U. S. v. 
Harriman, 130 F. Supp. 198; People v. Zendan.o,136 N.Y. 
Supp. 2d 106; DeYoung v. State, 27 4 S.W.2d 406 and 
McLedon v. State, 74 So.2d 656. See also State v. 
Crocker, 80 S.E.2d 243, 239 No. Caro. 446, where the 
court held that when the accused has consented to the 
actions of the court, though double jeopardy would have 
attached without his consent, his consent is a bar to the: 
defense of former jeopardy. The court in State v. Row-
land, 239 P.2d 949, 172 Kan. 222, held that a dismissal of 
a criminal case without prejudice by the county attorney 
did not prejudice a new information charging accused 
with the crime based upon identical facts that were the 
basis of the original information filed. 
Grand larceny is an included offense when the . 
accused is charged with robbery in this state. State v. i 
O'Day, 73 P.2d 965; State v. Davis, 76 P. 705, 28 Utah, 10., 
Since grand larceny is included in the offense of robbery, 
the appellant herein could have entered a plea of guilty 
to grand larceny without the District Attorney ever find-
ing it necessary to file the second complaint. State v. 
O'Day and State v. Davis, supra. It would seem to be a 
very undesirable situation where, because of a minor pro-
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cedural mistake on the part of a prosecuting attorney such 
as occurred in this case, the defendant in a criminal action 
could be turned loose. 
Appellant, instead of being prejudiced by the second 
complaint, was given an unfair advantage over the State. 
Based upon an affidavit filed by the appellant, the court 
allowed him to change his plea from guilty to not guilty 
At this point appellant was in the very enviable posi-
tion of going to trial, not on the robbery charge as 
originally set up, but under the lesser charge of grand 
larceny-a charge he had already plead guilty to. 
Appellant also claims that the court erred in refus-
ing him the right to amend his plea to "not guilty by 
reason of insanity.'' The Code of Criminal Procedure 
requires that an accused, in order to use as a defense 
insanity, double jeopardy, etc., must comply with the 
statute. The appellant herein was not willing to place the 
matter of sanity before the court. He didn't want to use 
it as a defense (R. 136). Section 77-24-17, U.C.A. 1953, 
provides that : 
"When a defendant gices notice of the defense of 
insanity the court may select and appoint two 
alienists to examine the defendant and investigate 
his sanity • • • '' 
rrhe time referred to in this section in which notice must 
be given is set out under 77-22-16, U.C.A. 1953, which 
reads as follows : 
"Whenever a defendant shall propose to offer in 
his defense evidence that he is not guilty by rea-
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son of insanity, such defendant shall at the time 
of the arraignment, or within ten days thereafter,. 
but not less than four days before the trial of such 
cause, file and serve upon the prosecuting attorney 
in such cause, notice in writing of his intention to 
claim such defense. If the defandant fails to file 
such notice, he shall not be entitled to introduce 
evidence tending to establish such defense. The 
court may, however, permit such evidence to be 
introduced where good cause for the failure to 
file notice has been made to appear." 
Appellant failed to give notice as required, and there-
fore it was within the discretion of the court to refuse to 
allow him to amend his plea after the trial had com-
menced. Also the court had knowledge of appellant's 
recent stay in the State Hospital at Provo and was also 
aware of the fact that if he were insane he would still be 
there. The record also contained an order issuing from 
the Third District Court stating that the Hospital had 
certified appellant to be sane and directing the Sheriff of 
Salt Lake County to return him to the Salt Lake County 
Jail and to there await trial ( R. 71). 
The law in this state is settled regarding a person's 
sanity. It is that all persons are presumed to be sane. 
State v. Hadley, 65 Utah 109, 234 P. 940; State v. Green, 
78 Utah 580, 6 P.2d 177. This presumption applies also 
when the person has been discharged from a mental hos-
pital, assuming, of course, that the person was discharged 
as being sane. Cannon v. Commonwealth, 243 Ky. 302, 
47 S.W.2d 1075. Even though it may be shown that the 
accused may have been insane at the time the criminal 
offense occurred ,where he had lucid intervals it is pre-
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snmed that the crime was committed during such a lucid 
interval unless there is proof to the contrary. State v. 
Peterson, ........ Mo ......... , 154 S.W. 2d 134. Appellant 
herein has never introduced any evidence to show that he 
was not sane at the time the robbery took place in 1954 
and, as the court order indicates, he was certified as sane 
when he was returned to the County Jail. Therefore, the 
court did not abuse its discretion when it refused the 
appellant's motion to change his plea to not guilty by 
reason of insanity. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF HIS 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONFRONT THE 
WITNESSES AGAINST HIM. 
The record discloses that Wayne Luck was called 
qy the State and did testify to the fact that he was one of 
t~e victims of the robbery that the jury found appellant 
to have committed. He also testified to the fact that the 
watch that had been taken from him had been purchased 
just a year prior to the robbery and at the time of the 
robbery was worth $50.00. He indicated in his testimony 
that he would not have sold it for anything less than 
$50.00 since it had cost him originally $73.00. 
In the case of stolen property the value is usually 
determined by what the property's market value would 
have been at the time of the larceny, and where it would 
be difficult to determine the value, as in the case of cer-
tain jewelry and other personal property, the testimony 
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of the owner may be accepted as establishing a value for 
the property. State v. Moll, 112 Kan. 63, 209 P. 820; In 
Re Spaulding, 75 Kan. 163, 88 P. 547. Mr. Luck also·· 
testified to the fact that besides his watch his wallet was' 
also stolen and contained something less than $20.00, and 
that his glasses were also taken and had a market value. 
of $30.00 since it cost him that amount to replace them. 
Therefore, Mr. Luck's testimony was to the fact that from 
him personally the robbers took well in excess of $50.00 
worth of personal property. (R. 152, 153). 
The appellant objects very strongly to the facts that 
Luck was asked certain questions regarding State Exhibit 
No. 3, which was another watch, the State claiming that 
it had been taken from Dean Jones on the night of the 
robbery. A careful reading of the record (R. 181-183) will 
disclose that Luck at no time testified as to the value of 
that watch, nor to anything Jones may have said 
about his watch, only to the fact that Exhibit No. 3 had 
the same general appearance as the watch that Jones wa,f;'. 
wearing on the night of the robbery. His testimony is 
not hearsay; it is a disclosure of his own observations, 
and that alone. Both the watch identified by Mr. Luck as 
his and the one he had identified as having the same gen-
eral appearance as the one owned by Jones were identified 
by the next witness, Mr. Marion F. Barnett, the police 
officer from Twin Falls, Idaho, as the watches found 
secreted on the appellant's person (R. 186). 
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In the case of State v. Johnson, 37 New Mex. 280, 21 
P.2d 813, 89 ALR 1368, the court declared that articles 
found in the possession of the accused are admissible 
when such articles of property have been identified as 
belonging to the victims or victim of the crime. See also 
State v. Leftwich, 216 Iowa 1226, 250 N.W. 489. It is also 
relevant to show that following the commission of the 
crime the defendant had possession of specific articles 
which were later identified as belonging to the victims. 
People v. Collins, 64 Calif. 293, 30 P. 847; State v. Barnes, 
47 Ore. 592, 85 P. 998. Therefore, respondent believes that 
the appellant did have the opportunity of facing the wit-
nesses against him, of cross-examining them, of objecting 
to all evidence presented by the State, and therefore did 
not have his right abridged whereby he was entitled to 
face the witness against him. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT WAS XOT DEPRIVED OF HIS 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO CO~IPEL THE 
A':rTENDANCE OF \YITXESSES IX HIS 0\YN" BE-
HALF. 
Appellant makes the claim that his attorney was not 
given sufficient time to subpoena witnesses in his behalf. 
However, in the record and the brief submitted by appel-
lant there is no claim that he eYer gave the names to ~Ir. 
Ashworth, who was representing him at that time. Since 
there had been scYcn days bebYecu the time of ~Ir. Ash-
worth's appointment and the date of trial, there was more 
than ample time to ha ,.c had issued subpoenas for appel-
lant's witnesses. The record discloses (R. ~73-~76), that 
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the court informed appellant that he could contact those 
named by him as witnesses and, in fact, issued an order 
whereby the deputy who would take custody of the appel-
lant and return him to the County Jail was informed 
that appellant was to have the privilege of phoning the 
people named at that particular time. The next day when 
it came time for the appellant to put on his case, he in-
formed the court that he had not been able to get in touch 
with any of his important witnesses and therefore was 
willing to let one man that did appear go since his testi-
mony was not apparently very relevant to the defense 
appellant hoped to establish (R. 281). 
The order referred to by appellant that was issued by 
Judge Lewis Jones was made not during any criminal 
proceeding, but during a hearing on a writ of habeas 
corpus. This order was later modified by Judge Jones 
(R. 51) wherein he directed the clerk to enter an order 
that all orders issued by him at the habeas corpus hearing 
were to be subject to modification by the criminal division 
of the Third District Court. 
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POINT V 
'rHE VERDICT AND JUDGMENT IS NOT CON-
TRARY TO THE LAW AND EVIDENCE AND DOES 
NOT VIOLATE THE APPELLANT'S CONSTITU-
TIONAL RIGHTS. 
'< · The appellant objects to the instruction given by the 
court regarding the value of the property taken. Instruc-
tion 6 informed the jury that: 
''You are instructed in determining the value of 
the property alleged to have been taken from 
Jones and Lewis as charged in the information 
you may add the total value of the property to-
gether in determining its value as to whether or 
not it exceeds the sum of $50.00 lawful money of 
the United States or is equal to or under $50.00." 
The law has been long established that where different 
articles are stolen at the same time, it is but one transac-
tion and the aggregate value of all the articles deter-
ttnnes the grade of the offense. State v. JfcKee, 17 Utah 
3l70, 53 P. 733; State v. Mickel, 23 Utah 507, 65 P. 484; 
Ackerman v. State, 7 Wyoming 504, 54 P. 228; State v. 
1ll andich, 24 Nev. 336, 54 P. 516; People '· Reghetti, 66 
Calif. 184, 4 P. 1185. Therefore, there was no error in 
the instruction given by the court. Also where the accused 
is in possession of certain valuable property after the 
commission of the crime, it is relevant where the crime 
was committed for pecuniary gain and where there is 
evidence that the accused was not likely to have owned 
such property prior to that time. 
Appellant also complains that he was accused of 
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stealing from Dean Jones and Wayne Luck by the infor-
mation and therefore Dean Jones should have been pres-
ent during the trial. 
In the case of State v. McKee, supra, the court said 
this concerning the name of the owner of stolen property 
appearing in an information or indictment: 
''The name of the owner of stolen property is not 
a part of the crime. It is stated in indictments 
and informations as a matter of description,-
as to the particular species of stock or animals 
stolen, or as the kind, quality or peculiarity of 
other personal property taken may be mentioned. 
* • * The name of the owner is mentioned for the 
purpose of identification only.'' 
The appellant in examining Mr. Luck, brought out the 
fact that the bill of particular furnished Mr. Lee Hobbs, 
when he was acting as appellant's counsel, stated that the 
property taken from Luck had a total valuation of· 
approximately $22.00. However, appellant brought out 
the fact that Luck had not been asked about the value of 
the property when the bills of particular were furnished 
and therefore the figures thus supplied must give way to 
the actual testimony of Mr. Luck during the trial. Also 
appellant tries to make a great event of the fact that the· 
watches that were introduced as evidence had been 
changed in some respects, i.e. the replacing of the torn 
wrist bands. However, we feel this is of little consequence 
since the watches were properly identified as the ones 
found on appellant; there was no material change in the 
appearance of the watch and the testimony of Luck 
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placed a value on his watch that met the minimum amount 
fixed by statute for grand larceny and since the watches 
had been returned to the parties from whom they had 
been. taken with the permission of the court. There was 
no abuse of the court's discretion since the watches 
were properly identified and marked. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully, submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER 
Attorney General 
MAURICE D. JONES 
Ass·istant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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